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Abstract
In this paper, we study the optimal choices of the federal income tax, federal
transfers, and local taxes in a dynamic model of capital accumulation and with explicit
gamestructure s among multipleprivateage nts, multiplelocal gove rnme nts, and the
federal government. In general, the optimal local property tax is zero if the local
property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal local consumption
tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is chosen optimally, the
federal income tax can be either positive or negative. For most reasonable parameter
values, our numerical calculations have shown that with a positive local consumption
tax there exists a reverse transfer from local governments to the federal government.
c   2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classi cation: E0; H2; H4; H5; H7; O4; R5
Keywords: Income tax; Property tax; Consumption tax; Intergovernmental transfers;
Capital accumulation; Fiscal federalism
∗ Corresponding author. Development Research Group, The World Bank, MC2-611, 1818 H
St. N.W. Washington, DC 20433, USA. Wethank theNational Scie nceFoundation of China
for support.
E-mail address: hzou@worldbank.org (H.-f. Zou).
0165-1889/02/$-see front matter c   2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0165-1889(01)00017-31976 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003
1. Introduction
In an earlier contribution to optimal taxation and revenue-sharing in the
context of  scal federalism, Gordon (1983) has utilized a static model to
consider how local governments set the rules of local taxes including tax
rates and types of taxes in a decentralized form of decision-making, while
allowing the federal government the role of correcting externalities through
grants, revenue-sharing, and regulations on local tax bases. Recently, Persson
and Tabellini (1996a, b) have considered risk-sharing and redistribution across
local governments in a federation in static models involving risk.
Following Gordon (1983), and Persson and Tabellini (1996a, b), we ana-
lyze the optimal choices of federal taxes, federal transfers, and local taxes in a
dynamic model of capital accumulation with multiple levels of government.1
This study considers multiple private agents and multiple local governments
and it allows us to see how the optimal choices of federal taxation and federal
transfers relate to heterogeneity across di erent private agents and di erent
local governments.
Our approach goes one step further in bringing the existing optimal taxa-
tion study closer to reality. In the existing literature on optimal income and
commodity taxation,2 the government is often taken to be a single iden-
tity, without introducing the structure of tax assignments and expenditure
assignments among multiple levels of government. But in reality, the income
tax is collected by central governments in Europe and jointly by the fed-
eral government and state governments in the United States; the property
tax is collected by local governments, and the commodity tax is collected
by both central governments and local governments in Europe, and by local
governments in the United States. In most developed countries, each level
of government has the power to determine tax rates and tax bases. In addi-
tion, there exist intergovernmental transfers in various forms among di erent
levels of government in every country of reasonable population size. It is
natural to se ehow thestructureof  scal fe de ralism a e cts thestructureof
optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfers.
Our dynamic approach is timely given that the design of tax assignments,
expenditure assignments, and intergovernmental transfers among di erent
levels of government has received considerable attention in the 1990s in the
context of  scal federalism, public sector reforms, and economic growth for
both developing and developed countries. One of the most important goals of
1 See Zou (1994, 1996), Brueckner (1996), Devarajan et al. (1996, 1998), Davoodi and Zou
(1998), and Zhang and Zou (1998) for related dynamic approaches to multi-level government
spending, intergovernmental transfers, federal taxes, and local taxes in a ‘federation’.
2 Classical contributions include, for example, Ramsey (1927), Mirrlees (1971), Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972, 1976), and Samuelson (1986). For comprehensive
literature reviews see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and Myles (1995).L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1977
establishing a sound intergovernmental  scal relationship is to promote local
as well as national economic growth (see Rivlin, 1992; Bird, 1993; Gramlich,
1993; Oates, 1993, 1999). Our dynamic model is a small step toward linking
 scal federalism and optimal economic growth within the context of some
speci c institutional arrangements in a federation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the general
framework for the dynamic Stackelberg (leader-follower) games (i) between
local governments (the leaders) and private agents (the followers), and (ii)
between the federal government (the leader) on one side and local govern-
ments (the followers) and private agents (the followers) on the other. Our
analysis will focus on open-loop equilibria because closed-loop speci cations
would bemoredi cult, and would also raiseproble ms with timeconsis-
tency. In this general, abstract form, we derive some results regarding the
optimal choices of local taxes, the federal income tax, and federal transfers.
In Se ction 3, weshow how theoptimal choice s of theincometax, thecon-
sumption tax, and the property tax with one level of government are di erent
from the corresponding choices with two levels of government. In Sections
4 and 5, through a concrete example, we see how the optimal choices of
taxes and federal transfers with two levels of government can be computed.
Since explicit solutions to complicated dynamic games are hard to come by,
weprovidesomecomparativeanalysis base d on nume rical calculations. We
conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. The framework
Following Gordon (1983), and Persson and Tabellini (1996a, b), we exam-
ine a two-tier federal system with many local governments. For our dynamic
analysis, it su ces to assume that there are two agents, two local govern-
ments, and the federal government in the economy. Agent 1 lives in locality
1, and agent 2 lives in locality 2. The federal government levies a uniform
incometax on age nts 1 and 2 at a  at rateof  f, whereas local govern-
ment i (i =1;2) levies a consumption tax,  i
ci; and a property or capital tax,3
 i
ki. Federal public spending is f in thenational jurisdiction, and local public
spending in local jurisdiction i (i=1;2) is si. Local government i (i=1;2) also
receives a matching federal transfer, gsi, with g as theuniform matching rate .
2.1. Agents (i =1 ;2)
As in Arrow and Kurz (1970), Barro (1990), Turnovsky (1995), and
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), government expenditures are introduced into
3 In this model, capital includes real estate property, and the property tax can be viewed as
a tax on capital (Mieszkowski, 1972). But, in general, these two are not equivalent because
capital is more mobile than real estate property from a local government’s perspective.1978 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003
the representative agent’s utility function. Unlike those studies, the model in-
troduces public expenditures at both the federal and local levels. The agent
derives a positive, but diminishing, marginal utility from the expenditures of
both the federal and local governments and private consumption. Let f; si;
and ci be federal expenditure, local expenditure, and private consumption,
respectively. If the utility function u(ci;f;s i) is twice di erentiable, the as-
sumption is equivalent to
uci¿0;u f¿0;u si¿0;u cici¡0;u ff¡0;u sisi¡0: (1)
In addition, u(ci;f;s i) satis es the Inada conditions
lim
si→0
usi = ∞; lim
f→0






uf =0 ; lim
ci→∞uci =0 : (2)




ui(ci;f;s i)e− t dt; (3)
where   is the positive, constant time preference.
Again following Arrow and Kurz (1970), Barro (1990), and Turnovsky
(1995), agent i’s output, yi; is produced by a constant-return-to-scale pro-
duction function with four inputs: capital stock, ki; labor input li, federal
government expenditure, f; and local government expenditure, si; namely
yi = yi(ki;l i;f;s i):
For simplicity, weassumethat theage nt’s labor input is  xe d at oneunit:
li =1 : Therefore, we just write agent i’s production function as
yi = yi(ki;f;s i): (4)
The marginal productivity of private capital stock, federal government ex-
penditure, and local government expenditure are positive and decreasing:
yki¿0;y f¿0;y si¿0;y cici¡0;y ff¡0;y sisi¡0: (5)
Federal government expenditure, f, is  nance d by theincometax on
the agent. Local government expenditure, si; is thesum of theconsumption
tax,4  i
cici, thecapital tax,  i
kiki, and federal government’s transfer, gsi.  f;  i
ci;
4 Consumption tax has been analyzed recently in growth models with one level of government
by King and Rebelo (1990), Rebelo (1991), and Jones et al. (1993), and Turnovsky (1995).L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1979
and  i
ki are the federal income tax rate, local consumption tax rate, and local
capital or property tax rate, respectively, and g is thematching rateof fe d-
eral grant for local spending. 5 Hence, the budget constraints for the federal
government and local government i (i =1 ;2) can bewritte n as follows:
f + gs1 + gs2 =  fy1 +  fy2; (6)
si − gsi =  i
cici +  i
kiki; (7)
respectively.




ui(ci;f;s i)e− t dt
subject to his budget constraint
dki
dt
=( 1−  f)yi(ki;f;s i) − (1 +  i
ci)ci − (  +  i
ki)ki: (8)
His initial capital stock is given by ki(0) = ki0.
Solving theoptimization proble m, weobtain the rst-orde r conditions
dki
dt
=( 1−  f)yi(ki;f;s i) − (1 +  i






(1 −  f)
@y i
@ki




uci =( 1+ i
ci) i: (10)
From Eq. (10), wehave
ci = ci( i;k i;  i
ci;f;s i): (11)
At the steady state, we have
(1 −  f)yi(ki;f;s i) − (1 +  i
ci)ci( i;k i;  i
ci;f;s i) − (  +  i
ki)ki =0 ; (12)
(1 −  f)
@y i
@ki
−   −   −  i
ki =0 : (13)
5 The matching grant here is justi ed on the ground that the federal government intends
to provide incentives for local public services. It can also be viewed as the way to transfer
resources among di erent levels of government. A straightforward extension is to allow ex-
ternalities (bene t spillover) in local public services in both utility functions and production
functions.1980 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003
2.2. Local governments (i =1 ;2)
In each locality, the local government and the private agent play the Stack-
elberg game with the local government as the leader and private agent the fol-
lower. 6 At the same time, in this section we assume that the local government
is the follower in the Stackelberg game with the federal government. 7 That
is to say, given the federal income tax rate, the federal matching grant, and
federal spending, the local government maximizes the agent’s welfare by
fully incorporating the agent’s  rst-order conditions in Section 2.1 into its
own maximization. Speci cally, the local government will choose its optimal
taxes,  i
ci and  i
ki; and its public expenditure, si; privatecapital stock, ki; and







subject to the steady-state conditions for individual i, (10), (12), and (13),
and thebudge t constraint of locality i; (7).







1(1 +  i
ci)+ i
4 i
ci +  i


























(1 −  f)
@y i
@ki










ki =0 ; (17)
6 See a similar technique used by Turnovsky and Brock (1980), Judd (1985), Chamley (1985,
1986), and Lucas (1990) in the context of the representative agent model with one level of
government.
7 The choices of federal government as the leader and local governments as followers are
natural in the light of recent policy discussions on how to harden the budget constraint on local
governments and how to avoid bailouts of local governments by the federal government in both





1ci −  i
3 i +  i
4ci +  i
6 =0 ; (18)
 i
6 i
ci =0 ;  i





1ki −  i
2 +  i
4ki +  i
5 =0 ; (20)
 i
5 i
ki =0 ;  i
ki ≥ 0;  i
5 ≥ 0; (21)
where  i
1 is the multiplier associated with Eq. (12);  i
2 is themultiplie r as-
sociated with Eq. (13);  i
3 is the multiplier associated with Eq. (10);  i
4 is
the multiplier associated with locality’s budget constraint equation (7);  i
1 is
themultiplie r associate d with thenonne gativeconstraint on theprope rty tax,
 i
ki ≥ 0; i
6 is the multiplier associated with the nonnegative constraint on the
consumption tax,  i
ci ≥ 0:
Proposition 1. The optimal steady-state property taxes in the two localities
are zero.8
Proof. Suppose  i
ki  = 0. From Eqs. (18) and (20), wehave
sign( i
2) = sign(− i
1 +  i
4)=−sign( i
6) ≤ 0:
But from Eq. (17), wehave
 i
1  +  i








1  ≥ 0;  i
2(1− f)@2yi=@k2
i ≥ 0; and  i
4 i
ki ≥ 0: Therefore, we must have
 i
1  =0 ;  i









1 =  i
2 =  i
3 =  i
4 =  i
5 =0 :
8 Theoptimal prope rty tax would bene gativewithout thenonne gativeconstraint on the
property tax,  i
ki ≥ 0.1982 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003




which is impossible by our assumption. Hence, we must have  i
ki =0 :
The intuition is as follows. For local governments, the consumption tax is
less distortionary than the capital (property) tax in its adverse e ect on private
production and capital accumulation. Without thenonne gativeconstraint on
theprope rty tax,  i
ki ≥ 0, the optimal local property tax is negative. The proof
is left as an exercise for the reader.
2.3. The federal government
Given the optimal choices of local governments and agents, the federal
government as the leader in its Stackelberg game with both the agents and
local governments chooses ki;s i;g i;  i
ci (i =1 ;2);  f; and f to maximizethe
weighted steady-state welfare of the two agents in the two localities with





 1u1(c1;f;s 1)+ 2u2(c2;f;s 2)
subject to the  rst-order conditions of the two localities: Eqs. (10), (7),
(12)–(21), and thebudge t constraint (6).
De  netheLagrangian function





1[(1 −  f)yi(ki;f;s i) − (1 +  i
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9; and  i
10 arethemultiplie rs associate d with
Eqs. (12)–(19), and (7), respectively, and   is the multiplier associated with
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plus Eqs. (12)–(19), and (7).L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1985
Proposition 2. If the local consumption tax is strictly positive; then the
federal transfer to localities can be negative or positive.
The proof is a mechanical, tedious demonstration that a negative value
of g and a positivevalueof g areboth consiste nt with the rst-orde r con-
ditions for federal maximization. Perhaps it  rst appears surprising that the
federal transfer to localities can be negative. The intuition is quite convinc-
ing. With a less distortionary consumption tax available at the local level, and
with the Stackelberg game between the federal government (the leader) and
local governments (the followers), the federal government can levy a smaller
incometax, which is moredistortionary than thelocal consumption tax. At
the same time, the federal government can ‘force’ a reverse transfer from
local governments to the federal government. In this way, part of the local
consumption tax  nances federal spending.
Furthermore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the federal income tax
is negative when the local consumption tax is available.
Proposition 3. If the local consumption tax is strictly positive; the federal
income tax can be positive or negative.
Again, the proof of this proposition follows from a mechanical procedure
that both a ne gativevalueof  f and a positivevalueof  f areconsiste nt with
the  rst-order conditions for federal optimization. In this case, the local con-
sumption tax is utilized to  nance both federal spending and federal subsidy
for private production. For a concrete example, see Table 2 in Section 4.
Proposition 3 stands in sharp contrast to there sult from theoptimal taxation
model where there is only one government. In the one government model, we
can show that, if a consumption tax is available, it is always optimal to set
a positiveconsumption tax, whilele vying no incometax. To illustratethis
point, weturn to theanalysis of optimal consumption tax, incometax, and
property tax with one government. This analysis also provides a benchmark
for our normative discussions in the context of multiple levels of government.
3. Taxes with one government
Supposethe reareoneindividual and onegove rnme nt. 9 Theindividual has
a preference de ned on private consumption good, c; and public good, G:
U(c;G): (33)
9 The model in this section is an extension of Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) with a
consumption tax.1986 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003
For simplicity, wetaketheutility function to bese parable , that is
U(c;G)=u(c)+v(G):
Output, y; is produced by the production function
y(k;G) (34)
which is de ned on private capital, k; and public good, G:
It is further assumed that both the utility function and the production func-
tion satisfy theusual Inada conditions.
The government collects a consumption tax,  cc, an incometax,  yy; and
a property tax,  kk. Hence, we have the balanced budget constraint for the
government
 cc +  yy +  kk = G: (35)
3.1. Individual maximization
Thebudge t constraint for individual can bewritte n as
dk(t)
dt
=( 1−  y)y(k;G) − (1 +  c)c − (  +  k)k: (36)
The representative agent chooses his consumption path, c(t); and capital ac-





subject to the budget constraint (36). The initial capital stock, k(0) = k0,i s
given.
De  netheHamiltonian as
H = u(c)+v(G)+ ((1 −  y)y(k;G) − (1 +  c)c − (  +  k)k):
The rst-orde r conditions are
@u(c)
@c





(1 −  y)
@y i(k;G)
@k
−   −   −  k

(38)L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1987
and thetransve rsality condition is
lim
t→∞ ke− t =0 :
From condition (37), wehave
c = c( c; ):
At the steady state, we have
(1 −  y)
@y i(k;G)
@k
−   −   −  k =0 ; (39)
(1 −  y)y(k;G) − (1 +  c)c( c; ) − (  +  k)k =0 : (40)
3.2. Government maximization
Given the optimal choices for the individual, the government chooses its
public service, G; and its taxes  y,  k; and  c to maximizetheste ady-state
agent’s welfare subject to its budget constraint, that is
maxU(c( c; );G)=u(c( c; )) + v(G)
subject to the individual’s  rst-order conditions (37), (39), (40), the budget
constraints of the government, (35), and the nonnegative constraints for the
tax rates:
 y ≥ 0;  k ≥ 0;  c ≥ 0:
Now, de  netheLagrangian function as
L=U(c( c; );G)+ 1

(1 −  y)
@y(k;G)
@k
−   −   −  k

+ 2[(1 −  y)y(k;G) − (1 +  c)c( c; ) − (  +  k)k]
+ 3[ cc( c; )+ yy +  kk − G]+ 4 k +  5 c +  6 y;
where  1 is the multiplier associated with Eq. (39),  2 is themultiplie r as-
sociated with Eq. (40),  3 is the multiplier associated with Eq. (35),  4;  5
and  6 arethemultiplie rs associate d with thenonne gativeconstraints of tax
rates, respectively.






−  2y(k;G)+ 3y +  6 =0 ; (41)1988 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003








−  2(1 +  c)
@c
@ 






= 1(1 −  y)
@2y(k;G)
@k2 +  2

(1 −  y)
@y(k;G)
@k
− (  +  k)







+  1(1 −  y)
@2y(k;G)
@k@G
+  2(1 −  y)
@y(k;G)
@G














+ 5 =0 ;
(46)
 5 c =0 ;  5 ≥0; (47)
@L
@ k
= − 1 −  2k +  3k +  4 =0 ; (48)
 4 k =0 ;  4 ≥0: (49)
Proposition 4. The steady-state property tax and income tax are zero; and
the steady-state consumption tax is positive.
Proof. Ste p 1: it is obvious that all thre etaxe s cannot bepositiveat thesame
time.
Ste p 2: any two taxe s among thethre ecannot bepositiveat thesametime .
This can be seen as follows:
1. If  k ¿0;  c ¿0, from Eqs. (43), (46), and (48), wehave
− 2 +  3 =0 ;  1 =0 :
Then, from Eq. (44), we have
 2






=0 :L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1989
Hence,








2. If  y ¿0;  c ¿0; from Eqs. (41), (43), and (46), wehave
− 2 +  3 =0 ;  1 =0 :
Then, again from Eq. (44), we have
 2 =  3 =0 ;  1 =0










+  2y(k;G) −  3y =0 ;






Ste p 3: weprovethat it is impossibleto have  c =0 : In fact, from
Eqs. (43) and (46), wehave
sign(− 2 +  3)=−sign( 5)≤0:
If  y ¿0;  6 =0 ; from Eq. (41), wehave
sign( 1) = sign(− 2 +  3)≤0:
Furthermore, from Eq. (44), we have
 1(1 −  y)
@2y(k;G)
@k2 +  2  =0 ;1990 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003
which leads to
 1 =0= 2:
But from (41), wemust have
 2 =  3 =0 ;  1 =0 ;
which again contradicts (43). Therefore,  y =0 :
If  k ¿0; from Eq. (48), wehave
sign( 1) = sign(− 2 +  3) ≤ 0:
Combining with Eq. (44), wehave
 1(1 −  y)
@2y(k;G)
@k2 +  2  +  3 k =0 ;
which in turn implies
 2 =  3 =0 ;  1 =0 :
This is again impossible. Hence  k =0 :
Now since government spending, G; enters both the utility function and
theproduction function, and sincetheInada conditions hold, gove rnme nt
spending must be  nanced by the consumption tax. Therefore,  c ¿0:
The intuition is rather simple: the consumption tax is less distortionary than
the income tax and the property tax. In a one-level government, it is optimal
to only tax consumption to  nance public spending. But when there are two
levels of government, this result does not hold anymore, as shown in Section
2. Now we turn back to our analysis of optimal taxes and federal transfer
when there are two levels of government.
4. An example
Oneof thedi cultie s with theoptimal taxation lite ratureis that wecannot
maketoo much intuitivese nseout of thenume rous  rst-orde r conditions.
Very often explicit solutions are very hard to obtain even in static models. In
this se ction, weshow that with somespe ci c production and utility functions,
wecan obtain e xplicit solutions to thelong-run optimal local taxe s, optimal
federal income tax, and optimal federal transfers in a dynamic framework.
However, hard and tedious calculations with a sense of guessing and good
luck are a prerequisite.L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1991
Let the production function be








where   +  +  + =1, and   +  + ¡1 because 0¡ ¡1 and li =1by
our assumption.
Let the utility function be
u(ci;f;s i)=l nci + !i
1 lnf + !i
2 lnsi:
First, from privateoptimization, wehave
ki =

  +   +  i
ki




i ;i =1 ;2;
yi =

  +   +  i
ki
 (1 −  f)
  =( −1)
f =(1− )s
 =(1− )
i ;i =1 ;2;
ci =











i ;i =1 ;2:
(50)






1 lnf + !i
2 lnsi
subject to (50) and its budget constraint
si − gsi =  i
cici +  i
kiki: (51)





  +( 1−  )(  +  i
ki)
 (1 +  i
ci)

  +   +  i
ki










  +   +  i
ki








ci(  +( 1−  ) )+(  i
ci +  ) i
ki




  +   +  i
ki












ci(  +( 1−  ) )+(  i
ci +  ) i
ki
 (1 +  i
ci)




 (1− )=(1− − )
×

  +   +  i
ki
 (1 −  f)
 −1=(1− − )
f =(1− − ): (52)
Now, the objective function for the local government can be rewritten as
lnci + !i
2 lnsi =ln(  +( 1−  )(  +  i




  − 1











=ln(  +( 1−  )(  +  i




  − 1
ln(  +   +  i
ki)+
!i
2(1 −  )+ 
1 −   −  
×[ln( i
ci(  +( 1−  ) )+(  i
ci +  ) i




2(1 −  )+ 
(1 −  )(1 −   −  )
ln(  +   +  i
ki) + constant: (53)
The local government’s optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing
the expression in Eq. (53) with respect to  i
ci and  i
ki: Thus, wehave
1 −  




2(1 −  )+ 
1 −   −  
 i
ci +  
 i
ci(  +( 1−  ) )+(  i




2(1 −  )+ 
(1 −  )(1 −   −  )
1




  − 1
1









2(1 −  )+ 
1 −   −  
×

  +( 1−  )  +  i
ki
 i
ci(  +( 1−  ) )+(  i








From theabovetwo e quations, wecan de te rmine  i





2(1 −  )+ 
1 −   −  
;
 i
ki =0: (54)L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1993
Third, for the federal government, it maximizes the weighted steady-state




 i(lnci + !i
1 lnf + !i
2 lnsi)
subject to the optimal behaviour of private agents and local governments and
its budget constraint:
f + gs1 + gs2 =  fy1 +  fy2 (55)








 (1 −  f)
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  =(1− − − )
: (56)
Hence, the objective function of the federal government can be written as
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The federal government’s optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing
the expression in Eq. (57) with respect to  f and g: Thus, wehave
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From these derivations above, we have
Proposition 5. The optimal local taxes; optimal federal income tax; and
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Table1
Optimal tax rates and transfers versus the productivity of local spending
  0.0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
 1
c 0.12 0.206154 0.30667 0.425455 0.568 0.742222 0.96
 2
c 0.1 0.184615 0.283333 0.4 0.54 0.711111 0.925
  f 0.244043 0.23142 0.216711 0.199333 0.178483 0.153002 0.121152
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1
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;
K =[  1C1 +  2C2]
1 −   −  
1 −   −   −  
:
In this proposition, as a result of speci c assumptions on the utility function
and technology, local consumption tax at locality i (i=1;2) only depends on
its own preference and technology parameters. However the optimal federal
income tax and transfers clearly depend on all preference and technology
parameters of the two localities plus the social-welfare weights assigned to
agent 1 and agent 2.
In order to get some intuition out of these explicit solutions of optimal
taxes and transfer schemes, let us make some numerical simulations.
In Table1, wefocus on how thechangein theproductivity of local pub-
lic spending measured by the parameter   a ects the choices of taxes and





2=0:1;  1=0:6;  2=0:4; and  =0:05:
When  =0, local public spending does not contribute to private production. 10
But at the same time, the productivity of federal public spending is set at
a relatively high value:   =0 :2. Therefore, it is optimal to let localities 1
and 2 levy consumption taxes and transfer a large share of local revenues to
10 Local spending does enter the utility function of the agents as !1
2 =0 :2 and !2
2 =0 :1:L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1997
Table2
Optimal tax rates and transfers versus the productivity of private
Capital
   1
c  2
c   f g  1
k  2
k
0.10 0.26 0.2375 0.153934 −0.0232071 0 0
0.15 0.269333 0.246667 0.136664 −0.105997 0 0
0.20 0.28 0.257143 0.118314 −0.200658 0 0
0.25 0.292328 0.269231 0.09863336 −0.309935 0 0
0.30 0.306667 0.283333 0.0772916 −0.437486 0 0
0.35 0.323636 0.3 0.0538344 −0.588302 0 0
0.40 0.344 0.32 0.0276274 −0.769371 0 0
0.45 0.368889 0.344444 −0.00224604 −0.990787 0 0
0.50 0.4 0.375 −0.0371607 −1.26769 0 0
0.55 0.44 0.414286 −0.0792772 −1.62389 0 0
the federal government to  nance federal spending. As local public spending
gradually becomes more productive (i.e.,   rises from zero to 0.30), local
consumption taxes rises sharply from around 10% to more than 90%. Please
note the di erence in the rates of the consumption tax between locality 1 and
locality 2, which results from the di erence in the e ects of local spending on
privateutility in thetwo localitie s. That is to say, since !1
2 =0:2¿! 2
2 =0:1;
it is always optimal for locality 1 to levy a higher consumption tax than
locality 2:  1
c ¿  2
c. As federal income tax is more distortionary than pure
consumption tax, the federal income tax rate gradually decreases from 24.4%
to 12.1%. At the same time, federal transfers are always negative, and local
consumption taxes are utilized to  nance federal spending. These ‘reverse’
federal transfers are always optimal when a local consumption tax is available
and when the federal government is the leader in its Stackelberg game with
local governments and private agents.
It is also possible for the federal government to levy a negative income
tax (provide a production subsidy) and ‘force’ the two local governments to
tax consumption and remit their revenues to the federal government. There-
fore, the less distortionary consumption tax can be used to  nance fed-
e ral spe nding and to subsidizeprivateproduction. This caseis illustrate d in
Table2.
This table shows the responses of the optimal tax rates and federal transfers
to changes in the productivity of private capital measured by the parameter
 . All other preference and production parameters are  xed at the following
values:   =0 :1;  =0 :1;! 1
1 =0 :1;! 2
1 =0 :12, !1
2 =0 :1, !2
2 =0 :1;  1 =0 :6;
 2 =0 :4; and   =0 :05. As   rises from 0.10 to 0.55, federal income tax
decreases from 15.4% to −7:9%. The rate of federal transfers changes from
−2:3% to −162%.1998 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003
Table3
Optimal tax rates and transfers versus the productivity of federal spending
  0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
 1
c 0.30667 0.30667 0.30667 0.30667 0.30667 0.30667 0.30667
 2
c 0.283333 0.283333 0.283333 0.283333 0.283333 0.283333 0.283333






While there does exist a rationale for optimal reverse transfers from local
to federal governments, the reality in developed countries shows the opposite.
We will not argue whether reality is a violation of the theoretical optimality
here. But it is interesting to note that, if we impose the condition g≥0; we
have
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Therefore, federal transfers are always zero. This ‘forced’ choice of federal
transfers e ectively precludes the federal government from taking the advan-
tage of the less distortionary local consumption to  nance federal spending
and subsidizeprivateproduction. A simplee xampleis give n in Table3.
In Table 3, the measure of the productivity of federal spending rises from
0.01 to a very high value of 0.30. Other parameter values are set to be:
  =0 :3;  =0 :1;! 1
1 =0 :2;! 2
1 =0 :12;! 1
2 =0 :2;! 2
2 =0 :1;  1 =0 :6;  2 =0 :4;
and   =0 :05: It is clear that, since g = 0, federal spending can only be
 nanced by the federal income tax. As its productivity increases, the federal
income tax rate rises from 34% to 44%. As a result of our chosen utility and
production functions, local consumption taxes remain constant since they are
independent of the productivity of federal spending.L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 1999
5. The case of a positive propertytax
In most developed countries, the local property tax is positive. In order to
generate a positive property tax in our model, it is easiest to set the local
consumption tax at zero. In this case, it can be shown that
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:
Table 4 illustrates how local property taxes change with respect to the
productivity of privatecapital.2000 L. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003
Table4
Optimal tax rates and transfers versus private productivity
  0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.40
 1
k 0.0548904 0.0357433 0.0264897 0.0210318 0.0174299
 2
k 0.0446251 0.0305477 0.0232356 0.0187604 0.0157411
  f 0.278583 0.292879 0.292324 0.286295 0.277641





In Table 4, we have set all other parameter values at  =0:1;  =0:2;! 1
1=
0:2;! 2
1 =0 :12;! 1
2 =0 :2;! 2
2 =0 :1;  1 =0 :6;  2 =0 :4; and   =0 :05. As the
productivity of privatecapital,  , rises, optimal property taxes in both locali-
ties decrease steadily. In the meantime, federal transfers to local governments
rise. The rising federal transfers are  nanced from the federal income tax,
which  rst increases and then declines—a typical La er curve. The reason
for this result is as follows. Local property taxes are always more distor-
tionary than thefe de ral incometax. As theproductivity of privatecapital
rises, it is optimal to reduce local property taxes and stimulate capital ac-
cumulation. To maintain local public spending, the federal government will
raiseits incometax and its transfe rs to localitie s. With a cut in theprop-
erty tax in both localities, coupled with rising productivity, private capital
accumulation accelerates. In the end, the tax base for the federal income tax
expands, and the federal government can raise even more revenues through a
reduced income tax rate. Therefore, the federal income tax is a La er curve
of theproductivity of privatecapital.
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented a  scal federalism approach to the optimal federal
income tax, local consumption tax, local property tax, and federal transfers in
a dynamic model of capital accumulation with some complicated structure of
the Stackelberg games among private agents, local governments, and the fed-
eral government. In general, the optimal long-run local property tax is zero if
the local property tax is constrained to be nonnegative, whereas the optimal
local consumption tax is always positive. When the local consumption tax is
chosen optimally, the federal income tax can be either positive or negative.
For most reasonable parameter values, our numerical calculations have shown
that with a positive local consumption tax, there is a reverse transfer from
local governments to the federal government. In this case, the local consump-
tion tax is used to  nance federal spending and even  nance federal subsidy
to privateproduction if privatecapital is ve ry productivere lativeto fe de ralL. Gong, H.-f. Zou/Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 26 (2002) 1975–2003 2001
and local public expenditures. These results stand in sharp contrast to the
real world where local governments usually receive transfers from the fed-
eral government. Of course, in light of a large body of literature on optimal
taxation sincethe1970s, it is not surprising to  nd that many optimal tax
(subsidy) formulas have not been carried out in practice. Whereas the actual
implementation of taxes and transfers in di erent countries are a result of
political, economic, and historical circumstances, our theoretical inquiry does
illustratethepote ntial we lfaregain from using thelocal consumption tax to
 nance federal spending and even to subsidize private production. However,
our  nding of a negative federal transfer is, at least partially, a result of
assuming away interjurisdictional bene t spillovers from local spending. In
the presence of such external bene ts, decentralized decisions about spending
would typically lead to the underprovision of such goods, hence makes it
e cient for the federal government to use a system of matching grants that
reduce the marginal cost of local spending and, thus, encourage a higher level
of spending on those goods that generate positive externalities.11
It is also worthwhileto notethat, without themulti-tie r gove rnme nt struc-
ture, namely, if there exists only a one-level government, it is always optimal
to set both the property tax and the income tax to zero when there is a con-
sumption tax. Once we have a two-tier system of federal government with
the Stackelberg game between the federal government (the leader) and local
governments (the followers) and private agents (the followers), the federal
incometax can bepositive .
In general, if the local consumption tax is set to zero, then the local prop-
erty tax is positive. Furthermore, in this case, the federal income tax and
federal transfers to local governments are always positive. This is because a
federal income tax is less distortionary than a local property tax in its adverse
e ect on private capital accumulation.
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